

PROCEEDINGS ICE 2017 P501 – P514
ISBN 978-967-0521-99-2

REVISIT OF TAIWAN LAND REFORM EXPERIENCES

Shih-Jung Hsu

Director and Professor, Center for the Third Sector, National Chengchi University, Taipei,
Taiwan

Email: srshiu@nccu.edu.tw

Li-Min Liao

Associate Professor and Director, Department of Accounting, China University of Technology,
Taipei, Taiwan

Email: gliao@cute.edu.tw

ABSTRACT

Traditionally, Taiwan land reform policy which was implemented between 1949-1953 had been recognized as a very success one. It not only solved problems of social inequality between landlords and tenants but also greatly improved agricultural and industrial production. It has also become major background for Taiwan's political, economic, and social development. Together, it helped to created the amazing story of Taiwan Miracle. Many books and research reports saved in the libraries explain this wonderful story and praise those political leaders for their great vision, wisdom and persistent. However, this paper does not follow the above arguments but propose a critical and different review of Taiwan land reform experiences.

The discourse on the implementation of Taiwan's land reform usually puts effort on the inequality of landlord-tenant institution and the serious exploitation from landlords toward tenants. Class differentiation between landlord and tenant is obvious, and rebellion from tenant is also imminent. In order to prevent social unrest and resolve disputes between them the KMT-state does not have choice but to perform land reform policy in 1940s and 1950s. However, the research would like to explore the relationship between landlords and tenants. Does their relation really inharmonious just as the state proclaims - landlords' exploitation? Do the tenants execute protest activities against their landlords? If the answer is no, then how can we explain this kind of situation? These are the major research questions the paper would like to investigate.

The privately-owned land institution and the tenancy system have been lasting for more than three hundred years in Taiwan. Even though the tenants receive very unequal treatment because of high rental rates, uncertainty of tenure, and etc, tenants protest movement seldom emerges in Taiwan history. The reason is probably because of the inequality of power relation between them since the landlords can easily expel their tenants. However, based on the field study, this research finds that a paternalistic ideology has been formed in landlords and tenants' minds. Landlord and tenant's relation is recognized as father and son; therefore, with the deep belief of Chinese filial piety, it is very impossible to have protest activities. The tenants are in a situation of powerlessness because of the shaping of ideology. On the surface, the relation between them is very harmonious, and it cannot be changed by itself. It can explain why there are around 29,000 cases, which the tenants would like to return their received land to their landlords after the first stage of land reform policy between 1950 and 1952.

The research argues that it is because the tenants cannot release themselves from this ideology; on the other hand, the landlords are also abided by subsistence ethic to support their tenants. It does not mean there is not exploitative relation. The tenants and their families are survival on the borderline of hunger. Nevertheless, the authoritarian state altered it; the implementation of land reform policies does bring a great benefit toward the tenants.

The research firstly investigates two policies in the Taiwan's land reform: one is "the 37.5% Farm Land Rent Reduction Program in 1949;" the other is "the Sales of Public Farm Land in 1948 and 1950s." The results related to the above questions are very different. Discontents from the domestic social origin toward landlords could not be confirmed in the case of the Farm Land Rent Reduction Program. The authoritarian control from the government and the terrific "228 event" took place in 1947 all played important roles to prevent Taiwan's landlords' opposition to the Farm Land Rent Reduction Program. The state did have completely control.

However, the subsistence ethic seemingly had been violated in the other case. Surprisingly, many peasants' movements emerged in the 1947 and 1948, which were against the state-owned Taiwan Sugar Company (TSC). It was because the TSC did not respect the landlord and tenant relationship originally from the Japanese Era and used force to expel tenants from their land. This behaviour did violate subsistence ethics for peasants. The authoritarian control used to justify the quiescence of landlords is not suitable to explain the emergence of those uprisings. The research maintains that those rebellions are the source for the policy of the Sales of Public Farm Land in 1948 and its followings.

Later, the research examines the third land reform policy --- the Land to the Tiller Program. Comparing with KMT's land reform experiences that took place in China before it moved to Taiwan after WWII, the research found that they were not many qualified "landlords" in Taiwan. Most of landowners in Taiwan did only possess a very small part of farmland and they are not landlord. But the authoritarian state expanded the definition of landlord to include them in order to implement the land reform policy. Unfortunately, they wrongly became the exploited class and lost their farmland. This did cause serious hardship to the small landholders, especially for those common ownership leased farmland. The state used the way of eminent domain to deprive their land ownership. This terrible story has never been told before.

Keywords: Land reform, the 37.5% Farm Land Rent Reduction Program, the Sales of Public Farm Land, the Land to the Tiller Program, The Taiwan Sugar Company.

1.0 Introduction

Taiwan land reform policies (1949-1953) had a great impact on Taiwan's society and its post-land reform developments. Economic and political conditions in the country changed with the implementation of land reform programs. About 43 percent of Taiwan's 660,000 farm families were affected by the reform measures, which produced a major improvement in peasant incomes. With higher yields and lower rents, the net income gain was 18 percent of total income in 1949 and jumped to 28 percent in 1952, 42 percent in 1955, and 44 percent in 1959 (Ho 1978, 169). With the reforms, both production and income spurted in the late 1950s, with income growing significantly faster. With the generation of a considerable surplus in the agricultural sector, the government sought to extract revenues to finance Taiwan's industrialization and economic development. The land reform and agricultural policies in the 1950s and 1960s were largely regarded as successful. Agricultural productivity and production increased and, in turn, incomes rose and inequality lessened in Taiwanese society. The agricultural sector supplied cheap food and helped to mitigate balance-of-payments problems through exports. It also provided a significant revenue to

support later industrialization. Many researches, therefore, have been made to figure out the essence behind Taiwan's successful land reform story.

The discourse of Taiwan's successful land reform put effort on the actors of external forces --- the KMT-state and the US aid. Many researchers indicate that the success of Taiwan's land reform is because of the accuracy of governmental policies (Amsden 1985, Hsiao 1981, Hsiao 1953, Yin 1984). The KMT-state is the key factor to design and implement land reform. Since the ruling elite came from China and did not have closed relations with Taiwan's landed-classes, they could institute policies without the interference from the local elite (Hsiao 1981, Huang 1995). However, one major reason for the passiveness of local elites was because they did not dare to speak out after the liquidation of 228 event in 1947, in which event thousands of Taiwanese elites were killed or sentenced to jail. In addition, the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) supported by the US also plays a key role in Taiwan land reform (Hsiao 1981, Huang 1995). As a result, the influential interpretations of Taiwan land reform are viewed as an epochal, one-time event caused primarily by external forces.

However, the objective of this research is to reexamine Taiwan's land reform experience from the vantagepoint of its domestic social origins. The agrarian class relations and cultural construction in and after Japanese colonial period might have had some specific influences on the initiation of land reform in post-war Taiwan. This research would like to investigate what types of tenancy relations existed? Did these relations promote or prevent the emergence of deprived consciousness of tenant classes? To what extent did changing landlord/tenant relations lead to different patterns of social discourse about village social relations and social stratification? In the face of conflict and/or continuity in village social relations, what elements of a cultural tool kits (e.g. symbols) were used to fashion social identities that were revealed in collection action, everyday resistance, or passive quiescence? A perspective using three dimensions of power will be developed to analyze the land reform experience in Taiwan.

There were three programs for Taiwan's land reform between 1949 and 1953: (1) 37.5% farmland rent reduction; (2) sales of public farmlands to landless farmers; and (3) compulsory purchase of private tenanted landholdings of landlords for resale to incumbent tillers. The paper is focus on the first program. The research tries to answer the above questions through face-to-face interview with respectable senior and elderly persons. Both landlords and tenants were chosen for interview. Researchers have designed interview protocol, and oral history is recorded in every interview. Related historical archives and academic literatures are also carefully examined. This current research is attempted to supplement the existing explanation for the story of Taiwan's land reform.

2.0 Rebellion or Quiescence?

The classical paradigm of social movements has been the social psychological theory. There are two major schools of this theory: emergent norms theory and relative deprivation theory. They share the basic assumption that individual deprivation, breakdown in the social order, and ideology are important preconditions for the emergence of collective action.

Emergent norms theory was synthesized by Turner and Killian (1987). They define collective protest as "those forms of social behavior in which usual conventions cease to guide social action and people collectively transcend, bypass, or subvert established institutional patterns and structure" (1987, 3). Collective protest happens when the normative order or the social structures are no longer accepted as

guidance in conflict situations. People conduct symbolic communications to establish new social norms and act on them. Collective protest occurs in conjunction with an event, or series of events, for which the culture cannot direct actions of the people, or by a sudden disruption of some aspect of the existing social organization, combined with the necessity for action -- as when a disaster occurs. In general, Turner and Killian suggest that "widespread collective behavior arises out of the inadequacy of culture on the one hand and out of the failure of the social organization to operate on the other hand" (1972, 412).

Relative deprivation theory was employed frequently in the 1960s to explain one of the most active periods of protest in American history. Many social movement scholars used it to describe the occurrence of American urban civil disturbances. There are different versions of this theory. A relatively broad definition was employed by Gurr (1970) and Morrison (1973) who argued that relative deprivation entails the perception that individual achievements have failed to keep pace with individual expectations. Geschwender (1964) uses a different definition. He employs the notion of a reference group, and indicates that relative deprivation is the perception that one's membership group is in a disadvantaged position relative to some other group. However, according to Gurney and Tierney, "a common thread in the literature is that relative deprivation is a perceived discrepancy between expectations and reality" (1982, 34). This discrepancy induces discontent or grievance which in turn combine to cause collective protest.

According to above social movement theories, social movements might be emerged because of discontent, grievance, cultural breakdown. However, mass inequalities or breakdown of traditional values are not necessary causes of the rebellion; on the contrary, quiescence could be the answer. Class domination or cultural hegemony would prevent the powerless to utter or to sense of their grievances. Social movement or collective actions would not take place in this situation. According to Gaventa (1980), it is important to examine power relationships between the powerful and the powerless.

In situations of inequality, the political response of the deprived may be seen as a function of power relationships. Power works to develop and maintain the quiescence of the powerless. Rebellion, as a corollary, may emerge as power relationships are altered. Together, pattern of power and powerless can keep issues from arising, grievances from being voiced, and interests from being recognized. (vi-vii)

Gaventa contrasts three definitions of power: a one-dimensional approach which he labels pluralist; a two-dimensional approach which he associates with the Bachrach-Baratz critique of pluralism; and a three-dimensional approach which incorporates the critical theories of Lukes. It is necessary to examine three approaches to the study of power and arguing that each carries with it a particular understanding of political inaction in the face of inequality.

The pluralist idea of power was developed in American political science by Dahl and Polsby. Dahl offers this definition of power : "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Qtd. in Gaventa 1980, 5). In the politics of a community, Polsby indicates that power may be studied by examining "who participated, who gains and loses, and who prevails in decision-making" (Qtd. in Gaventa 1980, 5). The key factor of pluralism in the definition of power, according to Gaventa (1980), is "a focus on behavior ---doing, participating" (5).

Gaventa labels this a one-dimensional approach because it confines the study of power to behavior. Structural, institutional and ideological factors are ignored or de-emphasized. This approach assumes

three conditions of collective protest: a) people act upon recognized grievances, b) in an open system, c) for themselves or through leaders. Non-participation or inaction in this formulation is not in and of itself a political problem. Political inaction can be interpreted as reflecting a pervasive sense of satisfaction with the consequences or operations of a given political process. It can also reflect the absence of net benefits to participation, implying again that the system is performing well enough.

This interpretation of democratic behavior, including non-participation, is challenged by Gaventa (1980): "A is thought to affect the action of B, but it is not considered a factor relevant to why B does not act in a manner that B otherwise might, were he not powerless relative to A (1980, 8). The failure to consider relative power at the structural level instigated Bachrach and Baratz and others to offer a two-dimensional approach to the study of power and collective action. Bachrach and Baratz, in a classic critique of pluralism, have argued that "power is exercised not just upon participants within the decision-making process but also towards the exclusion of certain participants and issues altogether" (Qtd. in Gaventa, 9). Exclusion occurs through the mobilization of bias in the political process. Bachrach and Baratz argue that the study of power must include consideration of the barriers to action upon grievances and must consider the structural and institutional obstacles (such as mobilization of bias and non-decision making) to effective action to redress grievances. Disaffected groups must battle structural and institutional conditions that favor onto the political agenda questions and issues that are systematically left off because they threaten elite power.

A third definition of power is offered by Lukes which roots power and its exercise in institutional, structural and ideological terms. Lukes defines the power relation as follows: "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests" (Gaventa 1980, 11). According to Gaventa, there are three circumstances which can be identified as meeting this definition. First, A may exercise power over B by forcing B to do what B does not want to do through an ideological process of influencing, shaping or determining B's very wants. Second, the exercise of power may occur in the absence of observable conflict through the sublimation of political interests by ideological or other means. This results in a conflict becoming latent and creates a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the interests of those they exclude. Third, the exercise of power transcends the individualistic, behavioral confines of pluralism insofar as politics is itself a product of social forces and institutional practices. In each case, affecting governmental decisionmaking is likely to have little effect since the domain of political action itself has become dependent upon and constrained by institutional structural and ideological factors. In these circumstances, only direct confrontation in order to fundamentally change the structures and institutions of power can effectively address the problem.

Social movement theories described above might be employed to explain the emergence of agrarian protests if there were some actions, which took place before the implementation of Taiwan's land reform. However, on the contrary, the three dimensions of power could elucidate why the tenants would like to keep silence and inaction no matter how serious they had been exploited. The second and third dimension of power could be denoted to as class domination and cultural hegemony, which probably caused the quiescence of Taiwan's tenants. What was the story of land reform in Taiwan --- rebellion or quiescence?

3.0 Imbalance Distribution of Land

The proportion of farmer-owners, tenants, and half farmer-owners (who own and leased some land) was showed in Table 1. More than one-third of Taiwan's farmers in 1922-1940 was tenants. However, the

combination of tenants and half farmer-owners accounted for around 70 percent of Taiwan's agricultural population. According to Table 2, the distribution of the land ownership was very imbalance: 64 percent of land owners occupied the land whose areas were lower than one *Chia*, a measure of land in Taiwan which is equal to 0.97 ha. And the total areas they own were accounted for only 15 percent of total agricultural land. On the contrary, 2.03 percent of land owners possessed the land whose areas were more than ten *Chia*. Ironically, the total areas they own were accounted for 36 percent of total agricultural land. The situation did not change in 1932 or 1939's survey, respectively.

Table 1 : Increase and Reduction of Farmers' Households in Taiwan (1922~40)

Unit: (1000 household , %)

	Farmers' Households				Percentage		
	Farmer-owners	Half farmer-owners	Tenants	Total	Farmer-owners	Half farmer-owners	Tenants
1922	116.7	111.5	157.1	385.3	30	29	41
1923	113.3	116.0	159.2	388.5	29	30	41
1924	114.3	116.1	159.8	390.5	29	30	41
1925	114.3	118.5	161.0	393.8	29	30	41
1926	114.6	119.3	161.9	395.8	29	30	41
1927	116.9	112.0	160.0	398.9	29	31	40
1928	118.3	124.5	162.7	405.5	29	31	40
1929	118.1	125.9	163.7	407.7	29	31	40
1930	119.5	126.4	165.4	411.4	29	31	40
1931	119.0	127.9	167.9	414.9	28	31	41
1932	132.2	119.3	152.4	404.0	32	30	38
1933	129.4	121.7	155.0	406.2	32	30	38
1934	130.1	125.0	156.9	412.0	32	30	38
1935	132.1	128.4	159.4	419.9	31	31	38
1936	132.3	134.1	161.8	428.1	31	31	38
1937	131.1	134.8	161.5	427.4	31	31	38
1938	130.2	135.6	158.7	424.6	31	32	37
1939	140.1	134.0	154.4	428.5	33	31	36
1940	137.4	134.4	158.2	429.9	32	31	37

Source : Tu, 1993, 252. Qtd. from Annual Report of Taiwan's Agriculture, 1933, 17; same as 1943, 8.

Table 2: Distribution of ownership of Taiwan's farmland (1920)

Degrees of area (<i>Chia</i>)	Households of owners		Area owned by farmland owners	
	Households	Percentage (%)	<i>Chia</i>	Percentage (%)
Lower than 0.5 <i>Chia</i>	172,931	42.68	40,987	5.68
0.5~1.0 <i>Chia</i>	86,711	21.40	62,513	8.67
1.0~2.0 <i>Chia</i>	70,739	17.16	100,140	13.88
2.0~3.0 <i>Chia</i>	28,412	7.01	69,749	9.67
3.0~5.0 <i>Chia</i>	23,276	5.74	88,672	12.29
5.0~7.0 <i>Chia</i>	8,989	2.22	52,176	7.23
7.0~10.0 <i>Chia</i>	5,902	1.46	48,890	6.78
10.0~20.0 <i>Chia</i>	5,454	1.35	73,722	10.22
20.0~30.0 <i>Chia</i>	1,353	0.33	32,995	4.57
30.0~50.0 <i>Chia</i>	842	0.21	31,837	4.41
50.0~100.0 <i>Chia</i>	376	0.09	25,497	3.54
Higher than 100.0 <i>Chia</i>	196	0.05	94,072	13.06
Total	405,181	100.00	721,250	100.00

Source: Wang 1966, 79.

One important reason for the imbalance distribution of land ownership was because the colonial government helped the Japanese capitalists to occupy a great amount of Taiwan's agricultural land for the production of sugar. Taiwan's farmers became the tenants for the sugar corporations. In addition, in order to have Japanese emigrated into Taiwan, the colonial government also entitled a great amount of land to the retired Japanese officials. Wang (1966, 80) then maintained that it was around 120,000 *Chia* farmland under Japanese title, which accounted for 15 percent of Taiwan's agricultural land. The colonial government and Japanese capitalists then were responsible for the imbalance distribution of land ownership. Tu (1993, 265-6) also indicated that the Japanese capitalism was also blamable for the class differentiation in Taiwan's society. Two specific different farming styles emerged at that time: one was the small-scale paddy rice farming, the other was the large-scale sugar cane cultivating field. The situation did not change after WWII.

4.0 High Percentage of Rental Rate

In Table 3, leased paddy fields accounted for 69.12 percent of Taiwan's paddy field, and leased dry land occupied 47.68 percent of Taiwan's dry farmland in 1920. One more important figure should be noted was the rate of rent, the percentage of rental amount paid to the farm-owners. In 1927, the average rate of rent for prime two-crop farmland was 49.3, 43.2 for prime single-crop farmland, and 29.9 for prime regular dry farmland (Table 4). The rate increased in the 1937's governmental report: 54.38 for prime two-crop farmland, and 36.79 for prime regular dry farmland (Table 5). Many reasons could explain the differences of the rental rates. It could be the variance of land fertile; the competition among tenants, and etc.

Table 3: Owned and Leased Land in Taiwan

Land Year	Paddy Land				Dry Land				Total			
	Owner Occupant		Leased Land		Owner Occupant		Leased Land		Owner Occupant		Leased Land	
	Area	%	Area	%	Area	%	Area	%	Area	%	Area	%
1920	104,342	30.88	233,466	69.12	184,975	52.32	168,580	47.68	389,317	41.84	402,046	58.16
1932	132,200	33.36	264,026	66.64	230,202	59.95	153,799	40.15	262,402	46.45	417,825	53.55
1939	207,613	38.71	328,770	61.29	165,150	52.07	152,029	47.93	377,762	43.67	480,799	56.33

Source: Wang 1966, 81.

Table 4: Farmland Rental Rates in Taiwan in 1927

Region	Two-Corp Land			Single- Corp Land			Regular Dry Land		
	Prime Land	Mediu m Land	Poor Land	Prime Land	Mediu m Land	Poor Land	Prime Land	Mediu m Land	Poor Land
Average	49.3	49.1	49.4	43.2	43.8	44.6	29.9	27.7	27.1
Old Taipei	53.3	54.3	53.9	53.5	55.9	54.4	20.8	24.6	23.0
Old Hsinchu	50.7	50.6	50.6	42.0	44.3	40.5	24.6	23.2	20.1
Old Taichung	49.6	48.8	49.0	37.3	30.4	34.7	27.0	26.1	27.1
Old Tainan	43.5	45.0	46.0	42.8	43.9	46.6	33.8	33.9	34.6
Old Kaohsiung	45.4	44.1	45.8	41.3	43.4	40.0	37.4	27.0	23.6
Old Taitung	48.2	47.9	47.9	49.3	50.6	49.9	29.1	28.9	36.7
Old Hualien	42.3	42.6	42.3	50.4	50.0	50.0	14.0	14.1	16.1
The Penghus	-	-	-	-	-	-	35.5	33.6	26.0

Source: Wang 1966, 82.

Table 5: Farm Land Rental Rates in Taiwan in 1937

Region	Paddy Land			Dry Land		
	Prime Land	Medium Land	Poor Land	Prime Land	Medium Land	Poor Land
Average	54.38	48.20	43.31	36.79	35.04	26.66
Old Taipei	51.33	50.90	47.46	35.75	30.19	26.22
Old Hsinchu	54.99	53.89	53.88	34.89	30.22	19.13
Old Taichung	55.91	50.05	48.66	40.74	33.22	26.52
Old Tainan	57.66	42.93	42.18	43.53	41.10	33.63
Old Kaohsiung	48.56	44.39	41.41	35.67	34.80	34.22
Old Taitung	-	47.79	51.42	-	-	23.59
Old Hualien	37.31	45.62	42.69	-	19.03	15.31
The Penghus	-	-	-	-	50.01	39.66

Source: Wang 1966, 82.

Undoubtedly, the rates for rent were very high. In addition, there were many other requirements toward the tenants. For example, the tenants should pay an amount of down payment as security deposit in advance to the landlords. The tenants also should pay most of the rent in the first harvest of the two-crop farmland since not only the quality of rice at that time was better than the second harvest but also it was harvested in lunar June, just before the period of natural disaster --- typhoon. The second harvest between July and November was very unstable, but the tenants and their families were mostly depended upon it for their living. On the contrary, tenants received very few protections. The contract of tenancy was decided per year, and it was mostly not signed in paper. Landlords then could easily remove tenants who did not obey to their requirements.

The situation did not change even though Taiwan was occupied by ROC government after the World War II. Taiwan was integrated into the Chinese economic system and seriously influenced by the price inflation of China. For example, the price of rice increased around 12,000 times from August 1945 to December 1948 (Chen 1995). In addition to economic situation, political disorder was also severe because different political factions coming from China to take over Taiwan could not cooperate but struggle among themselves. Many of them came to Taiwan to make a fortune. Taiwanese were despised and excluded from the political sphere. Taiwan was definitely not an important place for the KMT government when it battled with the Communist Party in China. It was China unification to be the most urgent goal in that era. Many resources were exported to China to support the KMT government, and the situation in Taiwan was worse and worse. Numerous Taiwanese were regretted to be unified with China. It was probably the above reasons, which caused the emergence of the February 28 (228) event in 1947. Taiwanese demonstrated on the streets and attacked police stations and radio stations. Serious fights erupted between Taiwanese and Chinese. Finally, military forces were dispatched from China to suppress the uprising, and thousands of Taiwanese were killed. Taiwan was totally under the authoritarian control after the event. It was difficult to hear voices or actions requesting or rejecting land reform within Taiwan's civil society (Lee 1993).

5.0 Authoritarian Atmosphere and Taiwan's Land Reform

There were three programs for Taiwan's land reform between 1949 and 1953, and the paper is focus on the first program --- 37.5% farmland rent reduction. It is important to put efforts on the first step to reexamine the domestic environment for its implementation. The basic content of it is the 37.5% farmland rent reduction program. It means that "the farm rents to be paid by a tenant to his landlord shall not exceed 37.5 per cent of the total annual yield of the main crop on the tenanted land (Hsiao 1968, 98)." It is the same as the 25% farmland rent reduction program implemented in China since the 1920s.¹ Although the Executive Yuan of the KMT government in China asked Taiwan to perform the 25% farmland rent reduction program in 1947² and the provincial government also gave its order³ to each administrative districts the reduction program did not comprehensively implemented⁴. The 37.5% farmland rent reduction program did not put in practice until Chen Cheng became the Governor of the Taiwan Provincial Government since January 1949.

Many administrative orders related to the 37.5% farmland rent reduction program were instituted in the early months of 1949, for example, "The Rental Regulation for Private Cultivated Land in Taiwan Province" and its bylaws. In addition to rent reduction, they asked landlords and their tenants need to have signed contracts, which also must register in township governments. The organizations of "Promotion Committee of the 37.5% Farmland Rent Reduction" were established in Taiwan province, every county, and every township. These committees not only tried to calculate the standard amount of annual yield of main crop in each category and grade of the farmland but also dealt with the disputes between landlords and tenants. Nevertheless, it should be noted that those administrative orders were not recognized from the legislative unit - the Provincial Assembly. The Assembly was in adjournment between December 1948 and June 1949, and it was in this period the 37.5% farmland rent reduction program was instituted and put into practice.

It was also important to know that the "Farmland Rent Reduction to 37.5% Act" was instituted in 1951, three years later after the implementation of the rent reduction program. It means those administrative orders concerning with rent reduction program did not have legal base. According to article 110 of the Land Law promulgated on April 29, 1946, "land rent cannot be higher than 8% of the land price. If the land rent is higher than 8% of the land price it should be reduced to meet the requirement. If the land rent is less than 8% of the land price it should not be changed." However, the Executive Yuan put a note next to this article, it indicated that:

¹ The meaning of the 25% farm land rent reduction program is that it assumes rent paid to landlords is half of annual yield. Within those 50% of rent, the KMT and the government maintain 25% reduction and return it to tenants. Therefore, the landlords actually receive 37.5% of annual yield.

² The order number is "tsung Erh Tzu Ti 10050 Hsun Ling (從貳字第10050訓令)." However, there did not have any regulated methods to implement the order at that time, which caused troubles to the county and city governments (Wang, Chang-His and Chang, Wei-Kuang 1955, 52).

³ The order number is "Chen Wen 36 Nien Shu Min Ti Nei Tzu Ti 121 Hao(辰文三六年署民地內字第121號代電)"

⁴ Ping Tung City located in southern Taiwan probably was the only one to abide by this order.

According to March 20, 1947 Executive Yuan Order "Tsung Erh Tzu Ti 10050 Hao Hsun Ling (從貳字第10050號訓令)" and March 15, 1947 National Government Order "Chu Tzu Ti 224 Hao Hsun Ling (處字第224號訓令)", the Highest Committee of National Defense in its No.223 standing conference decide that farmland rent handed over to landlords by tenants still regulated by 37.5% of the harvest of its main crops.

It is because of this note the provincial government of Taiwan regulated its administrative orders. The above note is put in the Article 2 of the "The Rental Regulation for Private Cultivated Land in Taiwan Province," and become the legal foundation for the implementation of rent reduction program in Taiwan. However, some important issues were not regulated in the Regulation, for example, the duration of the leasing contract.

However, there did not have any regulated methods to implement the order at that time, which caused troubles to the county and city governments (Wang, Chang-His and Chang, Wei-Kuang 1955, 52).

It is interested to inquire the intention of those provincial assemblymen, who were mostly big landlords in Taiwan. Huang, Chao-Chin, chairman of the Provincial Assembly, recalled that "when Chen Cheng decide to perform the 37.5% farmland rent reduction program and other land policies, many people predict he will meet force of resistance, especially from the Provincial Assembly since mostly assemblymen are renowned landlords (1965, 36)." Their benefits would be seriously curtailed because of the implementation of the rent reduction program. As a matter of fact, those assemblymen did not oppose to those policies at all; on the contrary, they openly supported land reform policies. On May 5, 1949, the Provincial Assembly issued a telegram, which called for the county and city councils to support the first step of the 37.5% farmland rent reduction program. According to Tung, Chung-Sheng, "Every county or city council announced its fully support to the rent reduction program. People were very impressed to their behavior. The council of the Tai-Chung County even supplied prize money to encourage the competition among each township under its jurisdiction (1949, 26)." In Taipei County, one famous councilman not only deleted his tenants' debt but also asked the government to carry out the reduction plan as soon as possible. The chairperson of the Ping-Tung city council was named as the "375 chairperson" because he progressively suggested the Ping-Tung city to execute the rent reduction plan first around Taiwan. He successfully persuaded his colleagues in the city council to sustain the rent reduction program. He even sent telegram to every county and city councils in Taiwan and suggested them to support the program.

The other phenomenon valued for noted was that it only took one month for the landlords to exchange signed contracts with the tenants. This activity started from May 1949 and ended in June 1949. Almost all leased farmland in Taiwan had a signed contract and, which also registered in every township in the same time. The efficiency of this work was marvelous! Some landlords even vigorously visited their tenants and asked them to sign the contract (Lee 1993, 252). Why the landlords, provincial assemblymen, and county and city councilmen behaved this way? Why they would like to sacrifice their benefit for the tenants?

Lee, Hsiao-Feng (1993, 252) explained that it was because of the authoritarian atmosphere at that period forced them to accept the rent reduction program. When Chen Cheng talked with the provincial

assemblymen, he said that "I respect public opinion all the time. However, only the 37.5% farmland rent reduction programs can not be argued at all, please support it (Chiang 1967, 21)." Chiang (1967, 21) indicated that Chen's speech implied the implication of "diplomacy (or courtesy) before the use of force." It was important to know that Chen not only was the Governor of Taiwan Province but also controlled military force in Taiwan. Some news report could explain Chen's determination of the rent reduction program.

There was a time that local administrators felt depression because landlords were not willing to sign a contract with their tenants. At that moment Governor Chen visited Taichung area and he summoned local chief administrators and elites to have a conference. In the meeting, he said that "the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program must completely implement. I believed there were some difficulties. I also believed that there were some people full of cunning and did not want to save their faces. But, I did believe nobody did not want to save their life." Because of this speech local administrators immediately solved the impasse. For example, after listened to Chen's speech, one famous landlord instantaneously asked twenty persons holding his name stamps to visit his tenants and to seal the contract. Afterwards, Governor further issued an order, which indicated that whoever disobeyed or obstructed the policy of rent reduction might be arrested and delivered to the Garrison Command. Landlords therefore abandoned their wait and see attitude and supported the exchange of the signed contract with the tenants.

There was another news report related to the implementation of rent reduction program.

Some landlords did not support the rent reduction program because their income would reduce one third. In the beginning, they did not abide by the orders, and just wanted to wait and see. They believed the government would talk a great deal about the rent reduction program with little or no follow-up action. To their surprise, the government did seriously execute its policy, and they were very afraid to know that landlords, who did not sign contract with their tenants would be arrested by the Garrison Command. At that moment, one truck driver was shot to death in Taipei because of traffic accident. Apprehensive for their safety, landlords were willing to sign contracts with the tenants at last.

In addition, it was also very important to examine state of affairs at that moment, comparing with the timetable of the rent reduction program. The year of 1949 was a year full of chaos in China because of the defeat of the KMT government by the communist. Although the National Government did not move to Taiwan until December 1949 Taiwan was seriously influenced by the political turmoil took place in China long before that day. Within the period of the implementation of the rent reduction program some political events emerged at the same time. On May 1, 1949, the government performed households' examination in whole Taiwan, and around 1,500 people were arrested. On May 5, the government ordered all black market money changers terminate their business with one month. On May 20, the government proclaimed martial law, people who obstructed peace and order of the society would have death sentence. Four days later, the government promulgated new regulation for emigration. On May 27, according to the martial law, the Garrison Command instituted two regulations; they were "regulation to prevent the following illegal activities: to assemble a meeting, to form a union, to parade, to petition, to boycott classes, to stage a strike from workers, to close shops, and to go on strike" and "regulation for newspaper, magazine, and publication." Accompanying with the impact of the 228 event, these new edicts certainly

would create the authoritarian atmosphere to the landlords and force them to support the rent reduction program. The reason for the implementation of 37.5% farmland rent reduction is from external force, not from domestic social origins.

6.0 Conclusion

Three dimensions of power argued by Lukes and Gaventa might explain the quiescence of the tenants. Tenants were definitely not free to participate in the public decision-making since they were controlled by the second and third dimensions of power. Class domination in the second dimension of power further induced cultural hegemony and ideological influence, which caused the docile of the tenants. They recognized their social position as normal and did not have the feeling of grievances. As Gaventa indicates, power relation between the tenants and landlords (or between the powerlessness and the power) could be viewed as "interrelated and accumulative in nature," and "each dimension serves to re-enforce the strength of the other (22)". The quiescence of the tenants or the powerful of the landlords was a long time process of power operation in the Taiwan's history.

In addition to the peasants' movements emerged in the late 1920s, it was difficult to find peasants' protest before the implementation of land reform policy. Agrarian unrest was almost unheard for the interviewees. Discontents from the domestic social origin could not be confirmed in this study. The subsistence ethic seemingly had not been violated even the transformation from the precapitalist society to the colonial and capitalist society in Taiwan. Class-consciousness was not built either. The authoritarian control of the colonial government also played an important role to prevent the emergence of peasants' movements. However, the inequality between the landlords and the tenants supplied a good operating field for the KMT government to fulfill its land reform programs. The KMT government inspired tenants' awareness of exploitation and their request for land reform. To understand Taiwan's land reform policy therefore should further make investigations on the KMT-state, the history of its defeated in the China, and the early history of its takeover of Taiwan. The external force was the major driver for the implementation of 37.5% farmland rent reduction program. However, can it also explain the second land reform program --- sales of public farmlands to landless farmers? It requires another paper to answer it.

References

- Amsden, Alice H. 1985. The state and Taiwan's economic development. In Bringing the state back in. eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 78-106. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gaventa, John. 1980. Power and powerlessness: Quiescence and rebellion in an Appalachian valley. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Geschwender, James. 1964. Social structure and the Negro revolt: An examination of some hypotheses. *Social Forces* 43;248-56.
- Gurney, Joan Neff and Kathleen J. Tierney. 1982. Relative deprivation and social movements: A critical look at twenty years of theory and research. *Sociological Quarterly* 23: 33-47.
- Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why men rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ho, Samuel P. S. 1978. Economic development of Taiwan, 1860-1970. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Hsiao, Hsin-huang Michael. 1981. Government agricultural strategies in Taiwan and South Korea: A macrosociological assessment. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
- Hsiao, Tseng. 1953. The theory and practice of land reform in the Republic of China. Taipei: China Research Institute of Land Economics.
- Huang, Chun-chieh. 1995. The transformation and perspectives of post-war Taiwan. Taipei: Cheng Chung Bookstore. (in Chinese)
- Huang, Shu-ching. 1957. Records of Taiwan's inspection. 8. Taipei: The Economic Research Chamber of Taiwan Bank. (in Chinese)
- Lee, Hsiao-feng. 1993. The early period of people's representatives in the post-war Taiwan. Taipei: Independent Evening News.
- Morrison, Denton. 1973. Some notes toward theory on relative deprivation, social movements, and social change. In Social movements: A reader and source book. Ed. R.R. Evans. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Turner, Ralph H. and Lewis M. Killian. 1987. Collective behavior, 3d ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Wang, Yih-tau. 1952. Problems and policies of Taiwan's tenancy. *Financial Economics Monthly* 2(3). (in Chinese)
- , 1966. The land institution and land policy before Taiwan's recovery. in The tenth volume of Taiwan's economic history. ed. The Economic Research Chamber of Taiwan Bank. Taipei: The Economic Research Chamber of Taiwan Bank. (in Chinese)
- Yin, Chang-fu. 1984. Land reform of China. Taipei: Chung Yang Wen Wu Publishing Company. (in Chinese)