As state polls loom, here’s a clear-eyed look at what’s legally enforceable, and what isn’t.

Article By: Marja Azlima Omar, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Science Social and Humanities

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As Sabah gears up for its next state election, the “20 Points” will resurface, as they always do, on campaign stages and in manifestos. Expect familiar promises: more autonomy, greater revenue share, protection of native rights, Borneonisation of the civil service, control over immigration, language and religion safeguards. But how much of the 20 Points is a legal guarantee you can enforce, and how much is political aspiration that still depends on negotiation? The answer to the question separates law from lore, so voters can press candidates on what is realistically deliverable after the ballots are counted.

First things first: What are the 20 Points?

The “20 Points” were a 1962 memorandum drafted by North Borneo (Sabah) leaders ahead of the formation of Malaysia. It set out conditions they wanted reflected in the terms of federation ranging from religion, language, immigration, fiscal arrangements, native rights, and local control of public services.

Essentially, the 20 Points is not itself a law or treaty. It informed the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) Report (1962) and, through that channel, influenced the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), the Malaysia Act 1963, and provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions. In court, judges do not enforce the 20 Points per se; they enforce constitutional text, statutes, and valid legal instruments that embody (or depart from) those points.

So, what is legally enforceable today?

Let us think the enforceability on the 20 Points in the form of a traffic-light spectrum whereby Green are those points that have strong legal footing, Amber on the other hand is those points that need some protection, but contestable. Lastly Red are those points that are political promise, far away from being legal right. The elaboration is as follows:

In the Green Lane are items with firm legal hooks that voters can rely on. Sabah’s immigration controls are entrenched in federal law that gives East Malaysia authority over entry by non-residents; disputes can go to court, but judges will focus on whether officials applied the rules lawfully, not on political preferences. Native law and customs, particularly over land are likewise grounded in written law whereby protection entrenches in the Constitution, land ordinances and native-court structures, so remedies turn on the precise statute and facts before the court. Lastly, Religious and language safeguards operate as constitutional guardrails in the sense that they set boundaries that make arbitrary or discriminatory decisions reviewable and reversible.

The Amber Lane mixes law with politics and administration. Borneonisation is recognised as an objective, yet not as a constitutional quota which means progress depends on public-service rules, Public Service Commission (PSC) practice and transparent targets, with judicial review available only for classic public-law wrongs (illegality, irrationality, procedural unfairness). Fiscal arrangements and special grants exist in the Constitution, but the quantum, timing and formulas commonly require executive negotiation and periodic orders; courts can interpret and police the process, while the actual numbers are hammered out at the table. Education and health devolution is constitutionally possible via concurrent powers and agreements, but delivering it needs intergovernmental compacts, staffing plans, budget lines and systems migration; litigation can clarify who may do what, not conjure the capacity to do it.

The Red Lane flags crowd-pleasing ideas that remain political unless converted into binding instruments. Fixed revenue shares (i.e. a guaranteed percentage of federal taxes collected in Sabah) are not hardwired today; making them real would require constitutional or statutory amendments plus budgetary restructuring and enforceable grant orders. Likewise, automatic veto-style powers for Sabah over federal policy do not fit the current federal design and would need constitutional change with supermajority support and this indeed no small feat. The practical test for any Red-zone promise is simple namely can it be traced to a specific article, bill, regulation or gazetted order with a timetable and enforcement mechanism? If not, it’s rhetoric in search of a legal vehicle

What changed with recent MA63-related moves?

Parliament has in recent years reaffirmed Sabah and Sarawak’s founding-status language in the Constitution and tightened definitions around “Malaysia Day.” Symbolically, this matters. Legally, it strengthens interpretive context for courts and governments to read autonomy provisions purposively. But symbolism does not automatically yield cash, competencies, or headcount. Those still need agreements, regulations, budgets, and sustained administrative follow-through.

Why politicians still cite the 20 Points

It is because the 20 Points is a moral compass and negotiating mandate. It reminds Putrajaya and Sabah’s own leadership what North Borneo believed it was signing up for in 1963. In law, it operates as context and purpose behind constitutional provisions; in politics, it energises demands for devolution, fairer funding, and recognition of native rights.

Voter’s checklist: Five questions to ask every candidate

So, if the politicians/candidates were to bring up 20 Points again (and again) in their manifesto, how should the voters approach the matter? Here are some suggestions/questions to ponder:

• Show me the legal hook. - For each 20 Points promise, which exact constitutional article or statute will you use or amend? If it is not in black-letter law, what instrument will you draft?
• Timeline and instrument. - Is the plan a federal–state agreement, regulation, or constitutional amendment? When will the draft be tabled, and who signs?
• Money on the table. - For fiscal promises, how much (RM), from which vote/head, and what mechanism enforces it (statutory formula, multi-year grant order, or MoF circular)?
• Administrative capacity. - If education/health powers shift, which agencies, staff, and IT systems move on Day 1? How will services avoid disruption?
• Accountability metrics. - What KPIs will prove Borneonisation is advancing (e.g., percentage Sabahans in Jusa/C-suite posts by year)? What public dashboard will track progress?

How the courts fit into this?

Courts remain vital, but they are not a silver bullet. However, through judicial review they can halt unlawful decisions that breach constitutional safeguards, clarify the scope of existing powers and duties so authorities act within their legal remit, and enforce procedural fairness and basic legality to ensure decisions are made lawfully and transparently.

Three realistic, near-term wins after the election

Three realistic near-term wins after the election are within reach if leaders convert rhetoric into instruments. First, a binding Federal–Sabah Financial Order can translate pledges into a statutory or gazetted grant mechanism with clear review dates and escalation clauses. Second, a Borneonisation Roadmap 2026–2030 via a public service circular. It should set yearly targets, build recruitment pipelines, tie scholarships to service bonds, enable lateral entry, and require an annual report to the State Assembly. Third, a Native Land Justice Package ought to update key land ordinances and court procedures, properly resource native courts, and publish a digitised cadastre to speed up recognition and reduce disputes.

The takeaway

The 20 Points still matter, unfortunately not as a magical key, but as the map legend for what Sabah sought in 1963. In this state election, meaningful change depends on whether candidates can translate that legend into enforceable instruments such as precise clauses, gazettes, budgets, timelines, and dashboards the public can verify. If a promise cannot be traced to a specific legal hook and an implementation instrument, treat it as rhetoric. If it can, hold the winners to it, point by point, if possible.